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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
This  study  analyses  the  impact  of  formal  standards  and  regulation  on  ﬁrms’  innovation  efﬁciency,  con-
sidering  different  levels  of market  uncertainty.  We  argue  that  formal  standards  and  regulation  have
different  effects,  depending  on the extent  of  market  uncertainty  derived  from  theoretical  considerations
about  information  asymmetry  and regulatory  capture.  Our empirical  analysis  is based  on  the German
Community  Innovation  Survey  (CIS).  The  results  show  that  formal  standards  lead  to  lower  innovation
efﬁciency  in  markets  with  low  uncertainty,  while  regulations  have  the  opposite  effect.  In cases  of  higheywords:
nnovation
egulation
ormal standardization
nformation asymmetry
egulatory capture
market  uncertainty,  we  observe  that  regulation  leads  to lower  innovation  efﬁciency,  while  formal  stan-
dards  have  the reverse  effect. Our results  have  important  implications  for the  future  application  of  both
instruments,  showing  that their  beneﬁts  heavily  depend  on the  market  environment.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).nnovation efﬁciency
. Introduction
Innovation has become an integral part of economic policy to
romote growth. However, public ﬁnancial support (e.g. subsidies)
or private innovation activities is constrained by limited public
udgets. In this context, shaping the existing regulatory framework
o support private innovation activities becomes more relevant and
ttractive (European Commission, 2016).
Regulatory framework is generally composed of regulations
nforced by governmental institutions. Industry and other affected
takeholders may  complement these governmental regulations by
elf-regulatory coordination (e.g. OECD, 1997).1 Their efforts can
∗ Corresponding author at: STATEC-National Institute of statistics and eco-
omic studies of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 13, rue Erasme B.P.304, L-2013,
uxembourg-ville, Luxembourg.
E-mail addresses: knut.blind@tu-berlin.de (K. Blind),
oeren.s.petersen@tu-berlin.de, petersen.soeren.simon@gmail.com (S.S. Petersen),
esare.riillo@statec.etat.lu (C.A.F. Riillo).
1 This article does not discuss speciﬁc regulatory instruments available to the
overnment, rather the focus is placed on regulation as a general form of coercive
ule setting and on formal standardization as a self-regulatory activity.
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2016.11.003
048-7333/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article uresult in voluntary commitments and standards released by pub-
licly accredited or even administrated standardization bodies. As
formal standards and regulations shape the paths of further tech-
nological developments (e.g. Swann, 2000; Blind, 2016), it is highly
important to understand their inﬂuence and functionality in order
to increase economic growth and welfare.
The impact of regulatory instruments on innovation has been
discussed with great controversy in academic literature on envi-
ronmental issues (see for example Palmer et al., 1995 versus Porter
and van der Linde, 1995). On the one hand, complying with regula-
tions is likely to increase costs or restricts ﬁrms’ freedom of action
(Palmer et al., 1995). On the other hand, well designed regulation
may  guide or even force ﬁrms to invest in innovative activities,
implement innovative processes or release innovative products
(Porter and van der Linde, 1995). Furthermore, research shows
that the characteristics of regulatory instruments and their ﬂexi-
bility towards implementation are crucial for increasing economic
welfare (Majumdar and Marcus, 2001). Not surprisingly, empirical
research has given no consistent picture in matters of the impact
of regulatory instruments on innovation (e.g. Aschhoff and Sofka,
2009; Blind, 2012).
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Our paper is related to two important streams of economic lit-
rature. The ﬁrst stream intensively discusses regulation (in any
orm) strictly as it relates to environmental issues (e.g. Palmer et al.,
995; Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Majumdar and Marcus, 2001;
ysing, 2009). The second stream investigates regulation outside
f the environmental ﬁeld and considers regulation as a possi-
le barrier to innovation (e.g. Baldwin and Lin, 2002; Galia and
egros, 2004; D’Este et al., 2012; Blanchard et al., 2013). D’Este et al.
2012) analyse regulatory requirements as one of the many barri-
rs to innovation, e.g. ﬁnancial constraints and a lack of human
esources, without an explicit focus on the regulatory framework.
owever, this stream often neglects self-regulatory instruments.
urprisingly, most of the literature do not differentiate between
ormal standards and governmental regulations, probably because
f a lack of data availability (e.g. Galia and Legros, 2004).2
However, it is important to decipher between the two as
he instruments differ substantially. Formal standards are devel-
ped in recognized standardization bodies and they are voluntary
nd consensus-driven (WTO, 2011).3 In contrast, regulations are
andatory legal restrictions released and enacted by the govern-
ent. Most studies have not stressed this distinction sufﬁciently
hen discussing their impact on innovation.
By using a unique dataset for Germany that allows us to differen-
iate between both instruments, our empirical research contributes
o the works mentioned above. More precisely, knowing whether
egulations or formal standards have hampered ﬁrm innovation
ctivities, we analyse their impact on a ﬁrm’s innovation efﬁciency
n different market environments. In general, efﬁciency is deﬁned
s the ratio between output and input. For a given output ﬁrms
sing less input are more efﬁcient. For the purpose of this study,
nput is deﬁned as the amount of resources (innovation expendi-
ures) a ﬁrm invests in the innovation process and output is deﬁned
s the successful introduction of a new product (innovation) into
he market. Hence, efﬁciency is deﬁned as the capability of a ﬁrm
o minimize innovation inputs given a certain quantity (or type) of
nnovation outputs.4
Our work is based on two main theoretical concepts: regulatory
apture and information asymmetry. Regulatory capture deﬁnes
he process in which stakeholders (e.g. industry) try to inﬂuence the
egulation-making body in favour of their own interests (Stigler,
971). We  refer to this concept to highlight the motivations and
apabilities of certain actors to inﬂuence formal standards and reg-
lations in different market conditions. Information asymmetry
odels describe a situation where two actors have different lev-
ls of information (e.g. Akerlof, 1970). In our analysis, we  combine
oth concepts to better understand the impact of regulation and
tandardization on innovation in different market conditions. This
s done to support the argument that at different levels of market
ncertainty, regulatory capture and asymmetric information have
ifferent effects on the setting of regulations and the development
f standards and their impacts on the concerned organizations.
Based on these theoretical considerations, we develop and
mpirically test whether regulations and standards have divergent
2 A noticeable exception is the working paper of Swann and Lambert (2010)
hat without considering uncertainty, investigates innovation success looking at
he informative and constraining effects of standards and regulation using UK Com-
unity Innovation survey data.
3 Even though formal standardization is a consensual process, it is often strate-
ically exploited by its participating ﬁrms. Hence, ﬁrms are using the formal
tandardization process, e.g. to raise a rival’s costs (Salop and Scheffman, 1987;
wann, 2000) to form alliances (Rosenkopf et al., 2001) or to generate knowledge
pillovers (Blind and Mangelsdorf, 2013).
4 We are using a relatively simple measure of innovation efﬁciency, i.e. innovation
xpenses of successful product innovators. As shown in the robustness checks in
ection ﬁve, our results are not changing when measuring innovation efﬁciency as
he  ratio of innovative sales above innovation costs.cy 46 (2017) 249–264
impacts on ﬁrms’ innovation efﬁciency at different levels of market
uncertainty. Our empirical analysis is based on the 2011 German
Community Innovation Survey, a reliable and extensive dataset
for ﬁrm-level innovation studies. For our analysis, we conduct a
Heckman model in order to control for the fact that investment in
innovation is only observable for ﬁrms that actually have decided to
invest in innovation. This approach is common in innovation stud-
ies (e.g. Kesidou and Demirel, 2012; Catozzella and Vivarelli, 2014).
Our results show that in markets with low uncertainty, ﬁrms must
spend a higher amount of resources in order to be innovative if
they experience problems with standards (i.e. standards decrease
ﬁrms’ innovation efﬁciency), while regulations have the opposite
effect (i.e. they enhance ﬁrms’ innovation efﬁciency). In the case
of markets with high uncertainty, we ﬁnd opposite effects: ﬁrms
that experienced problems with regulations had to spend more
resources to successfully introduce an innovation to the market
while formal standards have the opposite effect.
Our results enhance the academic discussion on the impacts of
formal standards and regulation on innovation. We  show theoret-
ically as well as empirically that both instruments have diverse
effects on innovation in different market conditions. In addition to
the contribution to literature, these results are particularly useful
for policy makers to stimulate the discussion on how different reg-
ulatory instruments should be used to shape the optimal regulatory
framework conditions in different market environments.
We proceed as follows: Section 2 outlines the theoretical frame-
work providing the background to our study. Section 3 discusses
the methods and data used. Section 4 presents the results about
the impact of regulation and formal standards on ﬁrms’ innovation
efﬁciency, differentiating between markets with different uncer-
tainty. Section 5 discusses the robustness of the results presented
in Section 4. Section 6 concludes with the discussion of the results
and their application to innovation policy.
2. Theoretical framework
Before discussing the impact of formal standards and regula-
tions, the differences between both instruments have to be outlined
in more detail. Formal standards are the result of a consensual
negotiation process carried out by ﬁrms and other interested stake-
holders in a voluntary process within standardization organizations
(WTO, 2011). Therefore, standard setting can be seen as a self-
regulatory process (Gupta and Lad, 1983), in which only a limited
number of companies are actively involved. For example, Wakke
et al. (2015) show that less than 5% of the Dutch service companies
are active in standardization.
Regulations are developed and enacted by the government to
shape the market environment and inﬂuence the behaviour of the
concerned actors (e.g. Blind, 2012). Correspondingly, regulations
stem primarily from a top-down approach, while formal stan-
dards are typically the result of a market-driven process (Büthe
and Mattli, 2011), or as Gupta and Lad (1983) frame it: “indus-
try self-regulation” vs. “direct governmental regulation”, which we
also apply in our conceptual model. Regulations and formal stan-
dards also differ substantially in terms of their enforcement. The
exertion of regulations is mandatory, while the adoption of formal
standards is, in most cases, voluntary.
In contrast to the noted differences, there are interdepen-
dencies of the two  instruments, especially in the course of
the “New Approach”.5 Nevertheless, around a third of European
standardization activities are developed to directly support the
implementation of European policies (CEN-CENELEC, 2013).
5 For further information, please refer to www.newapproach.org. A similar divi-
sion of work has been implemented in Germany.
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Table  1
Total effects of both instruments on innovation costs.
Costs of Regulatory Capture on
Innovation Costs
Costs of Information Asymmetry
on Innovation Costs
Total effects on
Innovation Costs
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In the case of the German standards, only 19.6% of published
erman formal standards are directly linked to governmental
egulations.6 This underlines that formal standards and regula-
ions do interact, but to a relatively limited extent in both a
heoretical and an empirical context. Nevertheless, we  assume
hat both instruments have different effects depending on their
mpact on ﬁrms’ innovation behaviour at different degrees of mar-
et uncertainty.7
In the following, we apply the theoretical concepts of infor-
ation asymmetry and regulatory capture to discuss the diverse
mpacts of both instruments on innovation in the context of differ-
nt degrees of technical uncertainty.
.1. Market uncertainty
In the context of innovation, uncertainty results from differ-
nt sources like competition, consumer behaviour or technological
omplexity (e.g. Jalonen, 2011; Sainio et al., 2012). The success
f innovation depends largely on the simultaneous and successful
nterplay of supplying new products and services and the buying
ehaviour of the consumers. Firms operating in a market with high
ncertainty may  be confronted by a highly heterogeneous techni-
al landscape and the unpredictable consumer behaviour. Different
echnologies may  compete with each other and thus increase
ncertainty among producers and consumers (e.g. Dosi, 1982). An
xample for such markets might be the automotive market for
lectric cars, where a dominant technical infrastructure is still miss-
ng and producers face problems to predict future development of
he technology. In this type of market, aside quality and price as
ecision parameters, consumers are presented with multiple com-
eting technology options. Waiting for the rise of the dominant
echnology infrastructure, consumers may  postpone buying inno-
ative products, especially if they have difﬁculties in assessing the
ntrinsic quality of different technologies. The uncertainty of cus-
omer behaviour augments the difﬁculties of producers to predict
echnological paths. Demand and supply are closely interrelated
nd both contribute to shape the uncertainty in the markets (e.g.
alonen, 2011). We  argue that regulation and standards have a sub-
tantial different impact on innovation efﬁciency in markets with
ifferent degree of uncertainty.8
For the econometric analysis, we operationalize the concept of
ncertainty developing a synthetic index of uncertainty, in line with
he work of Sainio et al. (2012) that combines different dimensions
f uncertainty. The uncertainty index is constructed by summing
he maximum score of the self-reported perception of uncertainty
n the technological context (i.e. technological development is
6 The data are retrieved from the Perinorm database (https://www.perinorm.
om). Up to 2014 out of 38,216 German formal standards only 7,683 were referenced
n  regulations.
7 Among all ﬁrms that have extended innovation projects because of standards or
egulations, only 27% have experienced problems with both regulations and stan-
ards highlighting the distinct effects of both instruments.
8 Possible interactions between regulatory instruments and market uncertainty
re not explicitly modelled for the sake of simplicity. We acknowledge that regula-
ory instruments may  shape the market conditions and reduce market uncertainty
n  the long-run. However, we note that in the short-run policy makers and other
conomic actors cannot immediately and directly modify the uncertainty in a mar-
et.Standards < Regulation Standards < Regulation
Standards = Regulation Standards > Regulation
difﬁcult to predict) and on the quality assessment (i.e. clients
have difﬁculties assessing the quality of products in advance).
Community Innovation Survey targets ﬁrms and does not include
information on the users of innovation. For this reason, the index
emphasizes technological aspects of the uncertainty and could be
labelled as “technological uncertainty”.
2.2. Regulatory capture
As stated in previous section, regulatory capture describes
a phenomenon where particular interest groups (e.g. industry)
try to inﬂuence governmental regulations in terms of their own
interests (Stigler, 1971). Generally, all types of rule-setting are
endangered by regulatory capture (Laffont and Tirole, 1991). While
the concept primarily focuses on the inﬂuence on state interven-
tion, i.e. governmental institutions, it can also be used to explain
why some ﬁrms are lobbying in standardization processes (Blind
and Mangelsdorf, 2016). In this context, formal standards can be
strategically used to raise rivals’ costs by creating market entry bar-
riers (Salop and Scheffman, 1987; Swann, 2000). De Vries (2006),
for example, shows that Tyco/AMP gained a considerable edge
over its close competitor AT&T by inﬂuencing international for-
mal  standardization.9 Moreover, even if formal standards are not
mandatory, they can inﬂuence the technological infrastructure of a
particular market (e.g. Swann, 2000; Blind, 2016). Therefore, they
can have a signiﬁcant impact not only on a ﬁrm’s compliance, but
also innovation costs if the ﬁrm relies on a particular standard.10
Very strict, speciﬁc technical speciﬁcations of a standard may
be one means by which to increase a ﬁrm’s competitive advantage
(Swann, 2000). The purposeful inclusion of intellectual property
(IP) is another option. In particular the GSM standard shows how
strategic alliance networks and IP, in the form of essential patents,
can have a signiﬁcant impact on the standardization process (Baron
et al., 2016) and market structure (Bekkers et al., 2002). Therefore,
the ongoing discussion on the strategic implementation of IP into
standards (e.g. Rysman and Simcoe, 2008; Berger et al., 2012) points
toward another occurrence of regulatory capture within the realms
of formal standardization processes.
We postulate that the effects of regulatory capture on formal
standardization vary according to the level of market uncertainty.
In instances of markets with low uncertainty, ﬁrms have a much
better chance to inﬂuence formal standards to align with their tech-
nological preferences, e.g. by pushing up the required quality level
of already established products as already argued by Swann (2000)
in a static market environment. Under these conditions, ﬁrms
involved in standard setting have more time to identify and involve
interested stakeholders and to ﬁnd a consensus to set standards
in a way to minimize their proprietary compliance and innova-
9 Prior literature highlights the concept of regulatory capture to primarily refer
to  regulations and rules imposed by the government. Following Swann, (2000), we
expand the breadth of the initial concept of regulatory capture in order to intro-
duce it to rule setting (self-regulation) outside of the governmental sector. As for
regulations, ﬁrms might try to “capture” standards in order to beneﬁt from their
underlying infrastructure as supported by Blind and Mangelsdorf (2016) which
explores companies’ motives for engaging in standardization.
10 It is important to mention that we  assume that those compliance costs are part
of  a ﬁrm’s innovation expenditures.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analyis.
Variable Description mean sd.
Variables of interest
Standards Standards extended the duration of innovation projects in
2008–2010
0.034 0.18
Regulation Regulation extended the duration of innovation projects in
2008–2010
0.035 0.18
No  uncert. Index of uncertainty. For each observation, the index takes
the maximum score of self-reported difﬁculty to predict
technological development and difﬁculties of clients to
assess quality. (cat.)
0.092 0.29
Low  uncert. 0.34 0.47
Medium uncert. 0.44 0.50
High  uncert. 0.13 0.34
Dependent variables
P. innovator Firms reporting innovation success (product, process) or
any innovation activity (ongoing, discontinued,
abandoned), i.e. innovation active ﬁrms.
0.56 0.50
Inn.  costs Total innovation costs 2010 per employee (ln) 7.58 1.59
Control variables
Size Ln. employees in 2010 (c) 3.67 1.65
Group Part of a group 0.30 0.46
Low  Tech NACE: 10–17, 18 excl. 18.2; 31; 32 excl.32.5 0.12 0.32
M-L  Tech NACE: 18.2; 19; 22–24; 25 excl. 25.4; 30.1; 33 0.16 0.37
M-H  Tech NACE: 20; 25.4; 27–29; 30 excl.30.1 and 30.3; 32.5 0.15 0.36
High  Tech NACE: 21; 26; 30.3 0.070 0.25
Utilities NACE: 41–43 0.075 0.26
Construction NACE: 45–47 0.017 0.13
Trade NACE: 49–53 0.047 0.21
Transport NACE: 55–56 0.059 0.23
ICT  NACE: 58–63 0.081 0.27
Financial NACE: 64–66; 68 0.029 0.17
Profess. and RE Professionals and Real Estates NACE:69–75 0.15 0.36
Support services NACE:77–82 0.049 0.22
Local  Sales in regional market 0.37 0.48
National Sales in national market 0.51 0.50
EU  Sales in EU, EFTA or UE candidates 0.061 0.24
International Sales in other markets 0.061 0.24
0  comp. No main competitor 0.061 0.24
1–5  comp. 1–5 main competitors 0.38 0.49
6–10  comp. 6–10 main competitors 0.23 0.42
11–15  comp. 11–15 main competitors 0.079 0.27
16–50  comp. 16–50 main competitors 0.092 0.29
50+  comp. More than 50 main competitors 0.16 0.36
Education % of employees with university degree (c) 21.9 26.0
No  R&D No in-house R&D in 2008–2010 0.29 0.45
Occasional R&D Occasionally in-house R&D in 2008–2010 0.51 0.50
Continuous R&D Continued in-house R&D in 2008–2010 0.19 0.40
Science Coop. Cooperation with universities, public or private institutes 0.38 0.49
Market Coop. Cooperation with clients or customers 0.19 0.39
Other ﬁrms Coop. Cooperation with competitors or other enterprises of the
same sector
0.28 0.45
Subsidies Received any public ﬁnancial support in 2008–2010 0.40 0.49
Observations 4,027
V = cont
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iariables are dummies, unless otherwise indicated; (cat.) = categorical variable; (c) 
omputed for the 2254 innovation active ﬁrms only.
ion costs. Accordingly, ﬁrms not involved in setting the standards
re apt to face higher compliance and innovation costs, because
he standards may  be not in line with their preferred production
echnology.
In contrast to formal standards, regulations are deﬁned by gov-
rnmental institutions. However, despite the implementation of
ounteractive measures, such institutions are not immune to reg-
latory capture. As Stigler (1971, p. 4) points out, political systems
[. . .]  are appropriate instruments for the fulﬁlment of desires of
embers of the society”. Based on that, one might argue that the
osts of regulatory capture to regulation might not signiﬁcantly
iffer from the cost of regulatory capture to formal standards.
evertheless, in case of formal standardization, ﬁrms do directly
obby within the standardization processes following their partic-
lar interests, while in cases of regulation, lobbying takes place
ndirectly. Correspondingly, we argue that the effects of regulatoryinuous variable; innovation costs, R&D and cooperation and subsidies statistics are
capture are much more signiﬁcant in instances of formal standard-
ization.
In the case of high market uncertainty, the effects of formal
standards and regulation in relation to regulatory capture do not
differ substantially from each other. In such market environments,
it can be difﬁcult to identify the superior standard (Cabral and
Salant, 2014) and subsequently raise competitors’ costs by inﬂu-
encing formal standards using the formal standard setting process.
Indeed, in more dynamic markets, several technological paths are
possible, while market conditions might change often and into
unpredictably. When markets are characterized by higher techno-
logical uncertainty, path dependency should be less pronounced.In such markets, setting standards according to personal techno-
logical preferences and potentially raising rivals’ costs is expected
to be much more difﬁcult. This is due to the fact that when the
technology is not yet determined, it may  be easier to work around
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 particular standard. Consequently, in highly uncertain markets it
s difﬁcult to inﬂuence all possible future developments via stan-
ards to increase a ﬁrm’s competitiveness, e.g. by raising rivals’
osts.11
The same applies for regulation. Even if lobbying is possible,
he direction of technological development is unclear. Therefore,
he innovation costs caused by regulatory capture associated with
egulation and with formal standards are the same in case of high
arket uncertainty.
In summary, from a regulatory capture point of view, innovation
osts associated with formal standards are higher than for regula-
ion at a lower level of market uncertainty, while they should not
iffer signiﬁcantly in cases of high market uncertainty. Based on
hese considerations, we derive our ﬁrst hypothesis:
1. In markets with low uncertainty, formal standards reduce
rms’ innovation efﬁciency stronger compared to regulation.
.3. Information asymmetry
Standards setters and legislators have different levels of knowl-
dge about technological frontier. In this section, we  propose that
his information asymmetry plays an important role in how regu-
ations or formal standards affect ﬁrms’ innovation process.
We argue that, in most cases, a mismatch exists between the
peciﬁcations of existing regulations and formal standards on the
ne hand and the actual opportunities offered by the insight gen-
rated at the dynamic technological frontier on the other hand.
ur assumptions are based on Keck (1988), who shows that gov-
rnment technology programs are often inefﬁcient in terms of a
igniﬁcant mismatch between actual costs and realized beneﬁts. He
alls such programs “white elephants”. One of the main assump-
ions Keck makes − responsible for the existence of such white
lephants − is that the government has less information about
he economic value of a technology than the market actors (i.e.
ndustry) do. Accordingly, we argue that regulatory authorities and
arket actors have imperfect information as to how formal stan-
ards or regulations should be set in accordance with the actual
echnological frontier. Nevertheless, market actors should always
ave comparatively better information than governmental actors
ecause of their more robust knowledge of existing technological
pportunities.
Just as for regulatory capture, information asymmetries differ
n reference to different levels of market uncertainty. In case of no
ncertainty, full information is – in theory – available to all eco-
omic players (including regulators) that have access to the same
nformation, no information asymmetries exist. Therefore, formal
tandards and regulation perfectly support the in the market imple-
ented technologies and should − on average − have no signiﬁcant
egative impact on ﬁrms’ innovation costs.
When markets are characterized by rapidly changing and het-
rogeneous technical landscapes, the probability of a technological
ismatch increases and then differences in knowledge between
egulators and market actors can be more important for innova-
ion. Jalonen (2011, p. 26) comes to the conclusion “[. . .]  that the
ore unknown the domain (e.g. consequences and technology) of
he innovation, the more ambiguous are the regulations and, hence
11 We are not suggesting that ﬁrms are not competing for imposing their technol-
gy. We are modelling regulatory capture that can take place during formal standard
etting or rule setting processes. In this model, if a ﬁrm succeeds to impose its tech-
ology in the market, there is no uncertainty. The situation can be described as a
etting game. The probability that a technology, sponsored by a ﬁrm during the
tandardization process, is successful in the market is lower when several technical
aths exist. As lobbing for a particular standard is limited (due to both technical and
nancial reasons), ﬁrms can only bet on a very limited number of different standards.y 46 (2017) 249–264 253
more uncertainty is felt by innovators.” This coincides with our
argumentation that market uncertainty increases the potential for
technological misﬁt.
Whereas formal standards are the result of a market and indus-
try driven approach, regulations are generated by a top-down
approach and eventually enacted by the government. Conse-
quently, in uncertain markets regulators are confronted with a
higher level of information asymmetry than market actors engaged
in formal standard setting activities being closer both to technolo-
gies provided by the supply side and changes on the demand side.12
Based on these conditions, we  argue that in markets with high
uncertainty, formal standards generate lower compliance and con-
sequently innovation costs as they provide a better ﬁt to the existing
technological opportunities, while regulations have the opposite
effect. As a result, innovation costs required by the implementa-
tion of formal standards are lower than costs related to compliance
with regulations in instances of higher market uncertainty.
Based on these considerations, we develop our second hypoth-
esis:
H2. In markets with high uncertainty, regulation reduces ﬁrms’
innovation efﬁciency stronger compared to standards.
2.4. Total effects of formal standards and regulation
Based on the conceptual considerations outlined above, we
compare the total effects of regulation and formal standards on
innovation costs in the case of high and low market uncertainty.
Table 1 summarizes this comparison (a detailed description of the
derivations for the total effects can be found in the Appendix A).
In case of high market uncertainty, regulations impose higher
compliance and consequently innovation costs as they suffer from
a higher amount of information asymmetry, while the effects of
regulatory capture are similar with both instruments. In case of
low market uncertainty, standards are linked to a higher compli-
ance and consequently also to innovation expenditures as they are
more prone to regulatory capture, while the effects of information
asymmetry do not differ between regulations and standards.
3. Data & method
3.1. Data
For our empirical analysis, we use data from the German 2011
Community Innovation Survey (CIS) to analyse the impact of for-
mal  standards and regulation on ﬁrms’ innovation efﬁciency. The
German CIS is carried out by the Centre for European Economic
Research (ZEW) on an annual basis and includes manufacturing
and service ﬁrms with ﬁve or more employees. Descriptive statis-
tics including precise economic industry coverage is provided in
Table 2 and correlation table is reported in Appendix Table A1 (for
exhaustive information on the collection of the data, the question-
naire and descriptive statistics, please refer to Aschhoff et al., 2013).regulation and formal standards as impeding factors for a ﬁrm’s
innovation activities, which are key variables for our model. The
12 In case of standardization, information asymmetry may  exist between standard-
izers and non-standardizers. Hence, ﬁrms active in formal standardization might
come up with technical standards neglecting the requirements relevant for non-
standardizers. Among standardizers, information asymmetries should barely exist
as  formal standardization process is characterized by a high degree of openness and
unanimity. However, participation in formal standardization is open to all market
actors and the drafts of formal standards are accessible for all interested stakehold-
ers.  Our point is that even if standardizers may  come up with standards that may  be
not the perfect match for all market actors, on average the standards match better
the technological frontier than the regulation.
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Table 3
Average marginal effects—Heckmann model.
First stage (1): Likelihood of
being an innovation-active ﬁrm
Second stage (2):
Innovation costs
Standard 0.121 (1.28)
Regulation 0.206** (2.03)
No  Uncertainty Ref. Ref.
Low  Uncertainty 0.0595** (2.36) 0.375* (1.82)
Medium Uncertainty 0.100*** (4.04) 0.679*** (3.36)
High  Uncertainty 0.107*** (3.66) 0.709*** (3.01)
Size  0.0684*** (13.41) 0.331*** (8.55)
Group 0.0210 (1.23) 0.232* (1.81)
Education 0.00297*** (9.01) 0.0255*** (10.36)
Local  Ref. Ref.
National 0.129*** (7.50) 1.179*** (8.76)
EU  0.252*** (7.60) 2.271*** (9.89)
International 0.191*** (5.47) 1.877*** (7.58)
No  R&D Ref. (.)
Discontinuous R&D 0.456*** (7.97)
Continuous R&D −0.145** (−2.32)
Subsidies 0.306*** (5.84)
Science Coop. 0.0225 (0.40)
Market Coop. 0.0754 (1.37)
Other  ﬁrms Coop. 0.233*** (4.48)
0  comp. Ref. Ref.
1–5  comp. 0.185*** (5.62) 1.282*** (5.14)
6–10  comp. 0.170*** (4.97) 1.187*** (4.63)
11–15  comp. 0.114*** (2.92) 0.826*** (2.87)
16–50  comp. 0.137*** (3.69) 0.978*** (3.56)
50+  comp. 0.0759** (2.13) 0.563** (2.09)
Observations 4,027 4,027
t statistics in parentheses.
Notes: Estimations based on the model 5 (Appendix A Table A2) innovation costs of innovators only; non engaged innovators have zero (0) innovation costs; sectors variables
are  not reported; effects of competition on innovation costs are only indirect.
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The second stage of the model (Eq. (2)) analyses the total amount of
a ﬁrm’s innovation expenditures. In doing so, variable yj depicts the
amount of innovation costs as a linear function of the variables of* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
sage of the German CIS is appropriate as German ﬁrms are −
ompared to other European ﬁrms − very active in formal stan-
ardization (ISO, 2011, p. 47).
The original sample of the German 2011 CIS includes 6,851
bservations. After removing observations with missing informa-
ion, we obtain a sample of 4,133 observations which is used for
he subsequent analysis.
.2. Heckman selection model
For our analysis it is important to differentiate between two
ypes of innovation barriers: revealed and deterring barriers as
iscussed by D’Este et al. (2012). A “revealed barrier” (e.g. formal
tandards) increases a ﬁrm’s perception of that particular barrier
ut does not deter the ﬁrm from innovating. This type of barrier
ay  in fact stimulate a positive learning process within ﬁrms (e.g.
he ﬁrms learn to cope with that particular barrier). Contrastingly,
 “deterring barrier” describes a barrier which discourages a ﬁrm
rom engaging in the innovation process (D’Este et al., 2012). Our
nalysis focuses on the revealing effect of standards and regulation
ecause, ﬁrms answer to the question whether standards (regula-
ion) “extended the duration of innovation projects” (Appendix A
eports the full question).
Innovation costs are observable only for ﬁrms engaged in the
nnovation process. This may  generate a potential self-selection
ias (Mairesse and Mohnen, 2010; Archibugi et al., 2013). More-
ver, an analysis restricted to innovating ﬁrms only would have
gnored information regarding non-innovating ﬁrms. The subse-
uent results would thereby be difﬁcult to extend to the whole
opulation of ﬁrms. For this reason, a Heckman selection model
Heckman, 1979) is used. The Heckman model on German CIS data
as been applied before by Rennings and Rammer (2011) to analysethe impact of environmental regulation on ﬁrm’s innovativeness.
Mate-Sanchez-Val and Harris (2014) use a Heckman model in com-
bination with CIS data analysing ﬁrms’ innovation activities. In line
with Archibugi et al. (2013), we restrict our analysis to innovators
only in the robustness check section. The Heckman model allows
for the prediction of the innovation costs for all ﬁrms in the sam-
ple based on the observed characteristics. This is relevant because
small and service ﬁrms without formal R&D department may  have
difﬁculties to report correctly innovation ﬁgures (OECD, 2005).
After estimating the model, we compare the costs to ﬁrms introduc-
ing product innovation and reporting problems with regulations or
standards.
The Heckman model (Heckman, 1979)13 can be formally
described as following:
zj + u2j > 0 (1)
yj = xj  ˇ + u1j (2)
u1∼N (0, ) (3)
u2∼N (0, 1) (4)
corr (u1, u2) =  (5)
The model contains two  stages: the ﬁrst stage (Eq. (1)) models
the decision of a ﬁrm to engage in innovation activities, where zj
represents the ﬁrm’s features related to the innovation probability.13 The formal description is based on the STATA reference journal (STATA Corp., p.
781).
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Table 4
Wald tests of Differences between Innovation Costs.
Technological uncertainty ICr − ICs Z statistic
None −0.950*** (0.335)
Low 0.056 (0.209)
Medium 0.009 (0.351)
High 0.822** (0.351)
Notes: ICr = Innovation costs due to regulation; ICs = Innovation costs due to
standards.  = technological uncertainty; Z statistics in parentheses; Successful Inno-K. Blind et al. / Researc
nterest (xj) which can only be observed if a ﬁrm decides to engage
n innovation activities. The model assumes that the error terms
f the formulas (1) and (2) are characterized by a bivariate normal
istribution. The correlation of both terms is represented by the
orrelation coefﬁcient  (Eq. (5)). The estimation is performed using
ull maximum likelihood estimation.
Our ﬁnal empirical model is formulated as follows14:
StageI : Propensity to innovate (P.innovator) =
ˇ0 + ˇ1Market Uncertaintymu + ˇ2Size + ˇ3Group + ˇ4Education
+ˇ5Marketma + ˇ6Compet.nc + ε
(6
u ∈ {No, low, medium and high market uncertainty}ma ∈
Regional, national, European and international market}nc ∈ {0,
–5, 6–10, 11–15, 16–50 and 50+ competitors}
StageII : Innovation Cost = ˇ0 + ˇ1Z + ˇ2Regulation
+ˇ3Standards + ˇ4Inn.exprd
+ˇ5Subsidies + ˇ6Corp.C +  + ε
(7)
 Describes a vector including variables used in stage I without
ompet.nc . Estimated residuals from stage I.rd ∈ {No R&D, dis-
ontinuous R&D and continuous R&D}C ∈ {Market cooperation,
cientiﬁc cooperation, cooperation with other ﬁrms}
The ﬁrst stage of the model (Eq. (6)) analyses a ﬁrm’s decision to
ngage in innovation activities (P. innovator) which is deﬁned as a
inary variable. A ﬁrm is characterized as an innovation-active ﬁrm
f it reports innovation success (i.e. product, process, organizational
r marketing innovation) or any innovation activities (i.e. including
ngoing, discontinued or abandoned research projects) between
008 and 2010.
The independent variables in the ﬁrst stage are: Market uncer-
ainty (Market Uncertainty), ﬁrm size (Size), if the ﬁrm is part of
 group (Group), education of the labour force (Education), mar-
et scope (Market) and the number of competitors in a ﬁrm’s
ain market (Compet.). Market uncertainty is operationalized as
 categorical variable measured on four levels: none, low, medium
nd high market uncertainty. For each observation, an uncertainty
ndex is constructed taking into account the maximum score of
he self-reported situation on the market environment (i.e. techno-
ogical development is difﬁcult to predict, clients have difﬁculties
ssessing the quality of products in advance).15 Size is measured
y the number of employees in logarithm. Education describes the
ercentage of employees in the ﬁrm with a university degree. Mar-
et scope depicts the activity of a ﬁrm in local, national, European
nd international markets.
The second stage of the model (Eq. (7)) analyses the total amount
f a ﬁrm’s innovation costs. The independent variable (Inn. cost)
s deﬁned as the total amount of innovation costs between 2008
nd 2010 per employee in logarithm. Regulation and standards can
nﬂuence several aspects of innovation costs (personnel, services of
hird parties, consumables).16 Therefore, in line with the deﬁnition
f the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005) the analysis considers not only in-
ouse R&D, but incorporates also costs in external R&D, acquisition
f software and external knowledge that is particularly relevant for
14 The description of the model follows Rennings and Rammer (2011).
15 This synthetic indicator is constructed using questions of a unique module of
IP  questionnaire about the characteristics that describe the competitive situation
f the enterprise. The exact wording of the questions for the calculation of market
ncertainty is reported in the Appendix (Question Q.2).
16 Unfortunately, the dataset does not allow us to directly observe the costs related
o  the compliance with standards or to regulations related to speciﬁc standards.
owever, we  rely on the empirical analyses conducted by Jaffe and Palmer (1997),
ndicating a positive effect of compliance expenditures on R&D expenditures as well
s  Ford et al. (2014) who  note a positive correlation between both indicators.vators only; Non innovation-active ﬁrms have no innovation expenses; *p < 0.10,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
the innovation success of small ﬁrms and service ﬁrms (e.g. Rammer
et al., 2009; Mangiarotti and Riillo, 2014).
The vector Z includes Market uncertainty (Market Uncertainty),
ﬁrm size (Size), if the ﬁrm is part of a group (Group), education of
the labour force (Education), market scope (Market).
Additional to the variables of the ﬁrst stage, we  include the vari-
able of interest that is whether a ﬁrm experienced some form of
impairment of its innovation projects caused by regulations (Reg-
ulation) or formal standards (Standard). The exact wording of the
questions discussing the effects of regulation and formal standard-
ization on innovation is reported in the Appendix A (Question
Q.1). The number of competitors (Compet.) is excluded for model
identiﬁcation.17
Based on the work of previous studies on the German CIS (e.g.
Grifﬁth et al., 2006), additional control variables are included in the
second stage: a dummy  variable measure if the ﬁrm has received
any public ﬁnancial support between 2008 and 2010 (Subsidies)
and if it cooperates with universities, public or private institutes
(Science Coop.), clients or customers (Market Coop.) and competi-
tors or other enterprises of the same sector (Other ﬁrms Coop.). In
house R&D indicates if a ﬁrm conducted no, occasional or contin-
uous in-house R&D in 2008–2010. The descriptive statistics of the
variables discussed above are included in Table 2.
4. Results
In the following section, we  present the empirical results of our
analysis. Several model speciﬁcations (see the Appendix A Table A2)
are used to indicate the appropriateness of our ﬁnal econometric
model. We  note that the Rho () is positive and statistically sig-
niﬁcant, suggesting that the Heckman model is appropriate for our
dataset and that unobservable features (e.g. ﬁrm culture) positively
affect the propensity and the intensity of innovation. The estimates
of our ﬁnal model (see the Appendix A Table A2, model 5) are
chosen as they are characterized by the most exhaustive speciﬁca-
tions and the lowest log likelihood. As our model includes several
interactions and the average marginal effects are easier to interpret
(Williams, 2012), for the sake of simplicity, we report and discuss
the average marginal effects indicated in Table 3.The ﬁrst stage of the model discusses the likelihood that a ﬁrm
is an innovation active ﬁrm. In line with Grifﬁth et al. (2006),
the model ﬁts the data satisfactorily, predicting almost 46% of the
17 Our model hinges on the idea that the number of competitors in the market
inﬂuences the chances of engaging in innovation but does not determinate the abso-
lute innovation expenditures. The number of competitors inﬂuence the decision to
invest in innovation activities, as innovativeness is a strong condition if a ﬁrm is
going to survive in a particular market (Aghion et al., 2002). On the other hand, the
number of competitors do not necessarily inﬂuence innovation expenditures. In an
oligopolistic market, for example smartphones (Apple vs. Samsung vs. Huawei), the
limited number of competitors does not lead to a decreasing level of innovation
expenditures. The same holds true for non-oligopolistic markets, Biotech, for exam-
ple.  Owing to that, the number of competitors should have no systematic impact on
the  level of innovation expenditures.
256 K. Blind et al. / Research Poli
Fig. 1. Average marginal effects of standards and regulation on innovation costs for
successful innovators at four levels of market uncertainty.
Notes:  Speciﬁcation (5) Successful Innovators only; Non innovation active ﬁrms have
zero (0) innovation costs; Controls are: size, group, sector of activity, export activ-
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oties in terms of main market, formal in-house R&D activity, subsidies, innovation
ooperation agreement with science institutions, market players and other ﬁrms.
he lines are interpolated and are not directly estimated.
bservations correctly, as shown in Table 4 in the Appendix A. The
ut-off value for correct prediction is the unconditional average of
nnovation active ﬁrms.
When discussing the effects of the control variables, we ﬁnd that
he probability of being an innovation-active ﬁrm increases with
arket uncertainty. In line with previous studies (e.g. Mairesse and
ohnen, 2010), ﬁrm size and education of the workforce are also
ound to increase the probability of a ﬁrm being an innovation-
ctive ﬁrm. The export activities (i.e. the internationalization of
he business) are positively correlated with innovation propen-
ity suggesting a close link between international competition
nd innovation (Grifﬁth et al., 2006). The propensity of being an
nnovation-active ﬁrm is the highest if a ﬁrm is active in the
uropean market. The relationship between the number of com-
etitors and the likelihood of being an innovation-active ﬁrm can
e described as a reverse U-shape, which is in line with the ﬁndings
f Aghion et al. (2002).
The second stage of the model analyses ﬁrm innovation costs.
e ﬁnd that on average − without distinguishing between different
evels of market uncertainty − regulation leads to an increase of
nnovation costs, while formal standards have no signiﬁcant effect.
s found in the ﬁrst stage, market uncertainty increases a ﬁrm’s
nnovation costs. Firm size, group membership and education of
he work force also have positive effects on such costs, although
hose of the latter are only marginal.
Export activities are positively correlated with innovation costs.
e also ﬁnd that performing discontinued R&D requires more
esources, while continuous R&D decreases the innovation costs.
his may  be because of high R&D set-up costs and the time depen-
ence of R&D. Not surprisingly, subsidies lead to an increase in R&D
xpenditures. With respect to cooperation, only cooperation with
ther ﬁrms has a signiﬁcant effect on a ﬁrm’s innovation costs.
inally, regarding the goodness-of-ﬁt, we note that the residual
nalyses reported in the Appendix Fig. A1, generally, do not show
articularly problematic issues.
After presenting the general results of the Heckman model,
e analyse the correlation of formal standards vs. regulations and
nnovation costs at different levels of market uncertainty. As shown
n Fig. 1, regulation and formal standards show different patterns at
ifferent levels of uncertainty, which is in line with our hypotheses.
he ordinate indicates the level of market uncertainty. The effects
f regulation (red line) and formal standards (blue line) on ﬁrms’cy 46 (2017) 249–264
innovation costs (of successful innovators only) at different levels
of market uncertainty are shown on the abscissa.
As Fig. 1 indicates, formal standards increase ﬁrms’ innovation
costs more than regulation in markets with low uncertainty, which
strongly supports our ﬁrst hypothesis. Furthermore, Fig. 1 indicates
that regulation leads to an increase in ﬁrms’ innovation costs in
markets with high uncertainty, giving strong support to our second
hypothesis.
More precisely, in markets with low and medium uncertainty,
regulation and standards have a comparable effect. Contingent
upon whether a ﬁrm reported any innovation activities, ﬁrms
which experienced obstacles with standards are more likely to
report higher innovation costs in markets characterized by low
uncertainty, while ﬁrms with regulation as obstacle report lower
innovation costs. When considering a highly uncertain market,
ﬁrms that report obstacles due to formal standards report lower
innovation costs, while ﬁrms experiencing obstacles due to regula-
tion report higher. In markets with low and medium uncertainty,
there is no statistically signiﬁcant difference between the effects of
regulation and standards.
In addition to the graphical representation above, our two
hypotheses are formally tested (Table 4). We  assess the difference
between the mean effects of regulation minus the mean effects of
the standards by conducting a Wald test. Table 4 indicates that, con-
ditional to a ﬁrm having reported any innovation activity, the cost
of formal standards for successful innovation is higher compared
to regulation in the case of low market uncertainty. In case of high
market uncertainty, the cost of regulation on successful innovation
is higher compared to the costs induced by formal standards. As
shown in Fig. 1, in markets with low and medium uncertainty, the
impact of regulation and formal standards on innovation expendi-
ture are substantially the same.
5. Robustness checks
An extensive robustness analysis is conducted to assess the sta-
bility of our results. The main pattern displayed in Fig. 1 does not
change signiﬁcantly, as shown in Fig. 2
The literature relating to barriers emphasizes that barriers might
hamper the completion of innovative projects only on ﬁrms that are
actually engaged in innovation activities (Savignac, 2008; D’Este
et al., 2012). For this reason, ﬁrms that are not interested in inno-
vation (i.e. not investing in innovation) are generally excluded from
the analysis. Similarly to Archibugi et al. (2013), we re-estimate the
model using only ﬁrms that report positive innovation costs (Graph
1 in Fig. 2). Additionally, we test our hypothesis regressing innova-
tion expenditures on the sample of ﬁrms with positive innovation
costs and product innovation (Graph 2 in Fig. 2). Graph 1 and 2
show that the pattern remains substantially unchanged.
As an additional control, we re-estimated the model consider-
ing a different measure of innovation efﬁciency. More precisely, as
shown in Graph 3 of Fig. 2, we  use the ratio of innovative sales on
innovation costs in natural logarithm as the dependent variable in
the second equation, in line with Catozzella and Vivarelli (2014).
The main difference is that we  take the natural log of the ratio
because it is skewed and presents extreme values. As further check,
we run the regression dropping the top 5 percentiles and we ﬁnd
similar results. Consistent with our previous results, ﬁrms experi-
encing problems with formal standards, i.e. formal standards were
responsible for causing delays to innovation projects, in markets
with low uncertainty are characterized by a lower degree of inno-
vation efﬁciency compared to ﬁrms experiencing problems with
regulation. The pattern reverses when uncertainty in the market is
high. The model estimates for different speciﬁcations are available
in Table A3 in the Appendix A. Additionally, we regress the ratio
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Fig. 2. Robustness checks.
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section appears to be substantially unaffected by several robustness
checks, as shown in Fig. 2f innovative sales on innovation costs using only the ﬁrms with
ositive innovation expenditures, as suggested by the innovation
arrier literature (Savignac, 2008; D’Este et al., 2012). Regulation
nd standards show a consistent pattern. Model estimates are avail-
ble in Table A4 in the Appendix A.
The analysis of survey data may  require the use of sampling
eights to account for the complex survey design (i.e. oversampling
f a particular subpopulation) or non-response adjustments as sug-
ested in the methodological literature (e.g. Winship and Radbill,
994; Lohr, 2010). For example, in their study on the Italian Com-
unity Innovation Survey 2002–2004, Evangelista and Vezzani
2010) use weighted data to compute descriptive ﬁgures but
erform statistical and econometric analyses using un-weighted
rm-level data. To evaluate the potential impact of sampling
eights on our analysis, the econometric model is re-estimated
sing survey sampling weights. As reported in Graph 5 in Fig. 2,
omparing weighted and unweighted results, the impact of stan-
ards and regulation increases in magnitude, but patterns remain
arkedly unchanged. Graph 6 shows that the pattern is unchanged
hen considering different deﬁnitions of innovation activities (i.e.
hen radical innovation is measured as the introduction of an inno-
ative product new for the market). As a further robustness check,
 different measure of uncertainty is calculated considering the
npredictability of competitor behaviour and of the quality of prod-
cts/services perceived by the customer. Graph 7 in Fig. 2 shows
hat the patterns stay substantially unchanged, but standard errors
ecome larger at the high uncertainty level.As discussed in the introduction, sometimes regulators may
explicitly refer to standards. Therefore, suspecting potential multi-
collinearity between regulation and formal standards, we repeated
the econometric analysis using more parsimonious speciﬁcations,
including one variable of interest at the time. However, the results
remain substantially the same.18 As shown in Graphs 8 and 9 in
Fig. 2, when restricting the analysis to ﬁrms explicitly reporting
that regulation and formal standards are relevant for their innova-
tion activities, the main result of the econometric analysis remains
unchanged. Graph 10 shows that results do not change when con-
trolling for potential impacts of all other barriers (e.g. ﬁnancial
constraints). Graph 11 reports results of the model excluding ﬁrms
for whom standards and regulations are not relevant. In other
words, echoing the barrier literature, we  include only ﬁrms that are
reporting that standards and regulations are inﬂuencing their inno-
vation process. Results are substantially unchanged. Potentially,
formal standards and regulation could deter ﬁrms from starting
innovation projects. Even when accounting for the potential deter-
ring effect of formal standards and regulation, the pattern remains
(Graph 12). Summing up, the patterns discussed in the previous18 Moreover, the Variance Inﬂation Factors are satisfactory (around 1) when esti-
mating the innovation efﬁciency including the reverse mills ratio but without the
interaction with dynamics. This reduces concerns about multi-collinearity.
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. Discussion and conclusion
This study makes important theoretical and empirical contribu-
ions to the ongoing discussion on the optimal policy interventions
o foster and support innovation. More precisely, it analyses the
mpacts of regulation and formal standards on ﬁrms’ innovation
fﬁciency in different market environments. Previous studies have,
heoretically and empirically, focused on environmental regulation
e.g. Palmer et al., 1995; Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Majumdar
nd Marcus, 2001) or barriers of innovation (e.g. Galia and Legros,
004; D’Este et al., 2012; Blanchard et al., 2013) without explicitely
istinguishing between regulation and formal standardization. Our
esearch links both streams of literature. Furthermore, by using the
heoretical concepts of regulatory capture and information asym-
etry, we argument that regulation and formal standardization
ave different effects on a ﬁrm’s innovation efﬁciency in the context
f different market environments.
Our empirical ﬁndings show that, in low uncertain markets,
rms’ innovation efﬁciency suffers more from standards as barriers
o innovation, whereas regulations have a positive inﬂuence. In the
ase of highly uncertain markets, this relationship is inverted.
Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that formal stan-
ardization is much more prone to regulatory capture in markets
ith low uncertainty. We  argue, that these rather mature mar-
ets are characterized by a more stable technical infrastructure
hich gives more opportunities for the limited number of standard
etting ﬁrms to efﬁciently inﬂuence a market’s technological infras-
ructure and create strong path dependencies. Such behaviour can
ead to high compliance and consequently innovation costs for all
ther ﬁrms, which has a negative effect on their overall innova-
ion efﬁciency. Regulation has a positive effect on ﬁrms’ innovation
fﬁciency in markets of low uncertainty. One possible explanation
ight be that regulations are less susceptible to regulatory capture.
urthermore, in markets with low uncertainty, the information
symmetry – and therefore the probability of misﬁts between reg-
lations and the underlying technologies – are much lower in
omparison with highly uncertain markets. Combining these argu-
ents, regulations might be helpful in more mature markets as
hey create transparent and non-discriminating rules.
In case of high market uncertainty, we ﬁnd the opposite
ffects. Highly uncertain markets are often characterized by an
nstable and fast changing technical environment, in which dif-
erent technological paths compete with each other. In such
arkets, information asymmetries that increase the probability of
 potential misﬁt between regulations or formal standards and the
nderlying market technologies increase drastically. This effect is
ore distinct in relation to regulations as they stem from a top-
own legislative process, contrary to formal standards which are
erived from a process driven mainly by the market (i.e. ﬁrms)
nd are therefore more closely connected to the requirements
f the underlying technology established in the markets. As a
esult, regulation has a negative impact on a ﬁrm’s innovation
fﬁciency in highly uncertain markets. Notably, formal standards
ave a positive effect on ﬁrms’ innovation efﬁciency. One possible
xplanation might be that formal standards decrease technolog-
cal uncertainty as they give direction for further technological
evelopments. Furthermore, in markets characterized by a high
evel of uncertainty, there are not yet established links between
tandards and regulations. Consequently, the principle of reg-
latory relief does not function yet and the efforts to comply
ith the emerging regulatory framework might increase signif-
cantly, whereas standards have a more positive guiding effect
han a negative cost creating effect on companies’ innovation
fforts.
Our results have far-reaching implications for innovation policy.
hey show the partially opposite impact of regulation and formalcy 46 (2017) 249–264
standardization in different market environments. Hence, to maxi-
mize social welfare, policy makers have to take into account the
different effects of regulation and formal standards in different
market environments. While regulation seems to be very fruitful
in more mature (i.e. technologically less uncertain) markets, self-
regulation in the form of standardization has to be protected against
the threats of regulatory capture, i.e. specifying standards in order
to achieve a competitive advantage for a minority group of ﬁrms
at the expense of the majority of ﬁrms that may have to adopt
these standards. On the contrary, in uncertain or more emerging
markets, regulators may  promote innovation by pushing the use
of formal standardization as a coordination instrument. Finally, we
interpret our results as evidence for the need of a closer coordina-
tion between government-driven regulation and industry-driven
standardization in order to exploit synergies and to minimize inef-
ﬁciencies generated by regulatory capture on the one hand, and
information asymmetry on the other hand.
Our analysis faces several limitations. From an empirical point of
view, we are measuring productivity in terms of how much input
(innovation expenses) is needed to achieve a speciﬁc innovation
output (introduce a new product or sales of innovative products).
Similar deﬁnitions are often implemented in the economic liter-
ature (e.g. Catozzella and Vivarelli, 2014; Gao and Chou, 2015).
However, we acknowledge that several aspects of productivity are
not captured by our operational deﬁnition of productivity. Other
measures of productivity more related to the innovation produc-
tion process (e.g. duration of research projects, number of patents,
time of researchers allocated to deal with standardization or regu-
lation) could enhance our analysis on productivity. This work is
left for future research. Looking at the operational deﬁnition of
uncertainty we note that this measure focuses on technological
aspects and partially captures the different sources of uncertainty
in the markets. We  believe that a more accurate measurement
of market uncertainty especially for the demand side may  better
qualify the inﬂuence of institutional instruments, such as regula-
tions or self-regulations via standards, on innovation. Additionally,
our analysis is based on a cross-sectional dataset, making it dif-
ﬁcult to fully evaluate for the long-term impact of regulations or
standards. However, we note that the impact of regulation and
standards are evaluated between 2008 and 2010, while innova-
tion costs refer to 2010 only, allowing for a lagged relationship
between the independent factors and the dependent variable. Addi-
tionally, even if there is considerable heterogeneity across ﬁrms and
across sectors, the average duration of research projects is below
24 months (Djellal and Gallouj 2001; Swink et al., 2006) and panel
studies on our dataset show that innovation behaviour is perma-
nent to a very large extent (Peters, 2009). Future research should
address potential causality issues when appropriate data is avail-
able. Another interesting research question is to investigate how
ﬁrms that are engaged in standardization do beneﬁt of inﬂuencing
the standards.
From a theoretical point of view, our model establishes a con-
nectedness between regulation, standardization, and innovation on
a general level. Nevertheless, previous research has addressed the
point that the interrelation of regulatory instruments might dif-
fer between countries (e.g. Prakash and Potoski, 2012; Berliner and
Prakash, 2013). For further validation, upcoming research has to
replicate our approach on an international level.
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ppendix A.
ormal derivation of hypotheses
Based on the conceptual considerations outlined in the theoret-
cal section, using simple algebra we show how we derive formally
he hypotheses.
The costs for innovation generated by regulation (ICr) are
eﬁned as the sum of information asymmetries (Ar) and regula-
ory capture costs (RCr). Similarly, costs for innovation caused by
tandards (ICs) are the sum of costs due to information asymmetries
As) and regulatory capture (RCs).
If Ar is equal to As and RCr < RCs when uncertainty is low
 = low), then the total costs generated by regulation are lower
han the costs caused by standards. In formula: ICr < ICs| = low.
Duration of Innovation projects have been extende
Legal restrictions  
Industry standards and norms  
S
The technological development is hard to predict 
Customers have problems to evaluate the beneﬁts of a product in advance y 46 (2017) 249–264 259
ICr = Ar+RCr
ICs = As+RCs
RCr < RCs| = low
Ar = As| = low
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
→ ICr < ICs| = low
When uncertainty is high
(
 = high
)
the relation is reversed.
If RCr is equal to RCs and Ar > As when uncertainty is high
( = high), then the total costs caused by regulation are higher
than the costs for innovation driven by standards. In formula:
ICr > ICs| = high
ICr = Ar+RCr
ICs = As+RCs
RCr = RCs| = high
Ar > As| = high
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
→ ICr > ICs| = high
Question Q.1: What effect did the following obstacles possi-
bly have to your innovation activities during 2008 to 2010?
(Multiple responses possible).
Innovation projects have been
d ended or discontinued not started in the ﬁrst place not relevant
  
  
Source:  Aschhoff et al. (2013, p. 308).
Question Q.2: Please describe how following characteristics
describe the market environment you are active in.
(Multiple responses possible)trongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree
   
   
Source:  Aschhoff et al. (2013, p. 304).
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Table A1
Pearson’s Correlation Table.
1  2  3  4 5  6 7 8 9  10  11  12 13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26
1  Standards  1.00
2 Regulation  0.45***  1.00
3 No  uncert. −0.03 −0.02 1.00
4 Low  uncert.  −0.02  −0.01  −0.23***1.00
5 Medium  uncert.  0.03*  0.01  −0.28***−0.64***1.00
6 High  uncert. 0.00  0.01  −0.12***−0.28***−0.34***1.00
7 Empl.  (ln)  0.08***  0.09***  0.00  0.10***  −0.02  −0.10***1.00
8 Group  0.07***  0.09***  0.01  0.05***  −0.01  −0.06***0.50***  1.00
9 Local  market  −0.09***−0.05***0.10***  −0.04*  −0.05***0.04**  −0.20***−0.16***1
10 National  market  0.04**  0.02  −0.08***0.00  0.05***  −0.02  0.08***  0.05***  −0.78***1
11 EU  market  0.07***  0.05**  −0.01  0.03  −0.01  −0.03  0.11***  0.09***  −0.19***−0.26***1
12 other  markets  0.02  0.03  −0.04**  0.04**  0.00  −0.03  0.12***  0.12***  −0.19***−0.26***−0.07***1.00
13 0  comp.  −0.01  −0.03  0.26***  −0.01  −0.11***−0.05**  −0.05**  0.00  0.16***  −0.13***−0.03  −0.03  1.00
14 1–5  comp.  0.03*  0.04*  −0.035*  0.06***  0.01  −0.06***0.06***  0.06***  −0.04*  −0.03  0.05**  0.08***  −0.20***1.00
15 6–10  comp.  0.01  0.00  −0.07***0.01  0.03  −0.01  0.07***  0.04*  −0.06***0.04**  0.03*  −0.01  −0.14***−0.43***1.00
16 11–15  comp.  −0.01  −0.02  −0.02  −0.028  0.03  0.01  0.01  −0.01  −0.02  0.02  −0.01  0.00  −0.07***−0.23***−0.16***1.00
17 16–50  comp. 0.01  0.01  −0.02  0.01  0.01  0.00  −0.01  −0.03  −0.03*  0.06***  −0.03  −0.03  −0.08***−0.25***−0.18***−0.09***1.00
18 50+  comp. −0.04** −0.03* −0.01 −0.07***0.00  0.11***  −0.12***−0.09***0.05**  0.00  −0.06***−0.06***−0.11***−0.34***−0.24***−0.13***−0.14***1.00
19 %  educated  labour  force  0.00  0.02  −0.08***−0.06***0.05**  0.07***  −0.16***−0.02  −0.19***0.13***  0.04**  0.06***  −0.03*  0.03*  0.00  0.00  0.01  −0.02  1.00
20 No  R&D  −0.16***−0.13***0.11***  −0.03  −0.05**  0.02  −0.26***−0.18***0.38***  −0.2***  −0.17***−0.18***0.13***  −0.13***−0.08***0.02  0.02  0.15***  −0.26***1.00
21 Occasionally  R&D  0.135***  0.12***  −0.08***0.01  0.05**  −0.01  0.27***  0.19***  −0.34***0.15***  0.18***  0.19***  −0.11***0.11***  0.07***  −0.03  −0.02  −0.12***0.24***  −0.77***1.00
22 Continuous  R&D  0.05**  0.02  −0.06***0.03  0.01  −0.01  0.02  0.00  −0.11***0.09***  0.01  0.01  −0.05**  0.04**  0.02  0.01  −0.01  −0.05**  0.05***  −0.44***−0.24***1.00
23 Cooperation  Science  and  Technology0.12***  0.09***  −0.07***0.02  0.02  0.00  0.22***  0.15***  −0.26***0.11***  0.14***  0.15***  −0.07***0.09***  0.04*  −0.02  −0.01  −0.09***0.26***  −0.55***0.54***  0.08***1.00
24 Cooperation  Market 0.11***  0.07***  −0.05**  0.00  0.03  −0.01  0.15***  0.13***  −0.20***0.1***  0.11***  0.08***  −0.06***0.08***  0.02  −0.01  −0.02  −0.07***0.19***  −0.38***0.38***  0.05**  0.53***1.00
25 Cooperation  Other  ﬁrms  0.14***  0.11***  −0.09***0.03*  0.02  0.00  0.24***  0.22***  −0.19***0.07***  0.11***  0.14***  −0.06***0.06***  0.05***  −0.04**  0.01  −0.08***0.16***  −0.44***0.44***  0.06***0.59***0.50***1.00
26 Subsides  0.09***  0.06***  −0.09***−0.01  0.05**  0.01  0.12***  0.05**  −0.27***0.12***  0.15***  0.14***  −0.07***0.09***  0.03  −0.02  −0.01  −0.09***0.29***  −0.55***0.55***  0.07***0.65***0.40***0.39***1
Correlation with sectors are available upon request.
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Table  A2
Heckman estimates for different speciﬁcations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Innovation Costs per employee (ln)
1.Standards 0.301** (2.05) 0.298** (2.04) 0.878 (1.56) 1.090** (2.44) 1.011** (2.29)
1.Regulation 0.335** (2.17) 0.332** (2.16) −1.039** (−2.57) −1.157** (−3.01) −0.963** (−2.52)
Size  −0.0820*** (−3.45) −0.0802*** (−3.37) −0.0792*** (−3.35) −0.128*** (−5.46) −0.151*** (−6.51)
Group  0.145* (1.92) 0.147* (1.95) 0.143* (1.90) 0.127* (1.75) 0.136* (1.87)
Education 0.0156*** (10.51) 0.0155*** (10.49) 0.0156*** (10.52) 0.0116*** (8.16) 0.00899*** (6.37)
Local  Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
National 0.584*** (6.39) 0.582*** (6.36) 0.583*** (6.38) 0.493*** (5.57) 0.494*** (5.71)
EU  1.128*** (8.98) 1.130*** (8.99) 1.134*** (9.01) 0.966*** (7.90) 0.936*** (7.79)
International 1.110*** (8.52) 1.110*** (8.53) 1.103*** (8.48) 0.914*** (7.11) 0.899*** (7.25)
No  Uncertainty Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Low  Uncertainty 0.0564 (0.41) −0.00684 (−0.05) −0.0208 (−0.15) −0.0790 (−0.58)
Medium Uncertainty 0.131 (0.98) 0.0699 (0.50) 0.0449 (0.33) −0.0104 (−0.08)
High  Uncertainty 0.152 (0.96) 0.0990 (0.60) 0.0844 (0.53) 0.0131 (0.08)
Stand.#L. uncert. −0.610 (−1.00) −0.825* (−1.65) −0.744 (−1.50)
Stand.#M. uncert. −0.477 (−0.80) −0.759 (−1.56) −0.769 (−1.60)
Stand.#H. uncert. −1.387** (−1.98) −1.805** (−2.99) −1.727** (−3.01)
Reg.#L. uncert. 1.515** (3.21) 1.552*** (3.47) 1.333** (2.98)
Reg.#M. uncert. 1.326** (2.84) 1.397** (3.14) 1.219** (2.77)
Reg.#H. uncert. 1.959*** (3.59) 1.876*** (3.55) 1.644** (3.17)
No  R&D Ref. Ref.
Discontinuous R&D 0.918*** (11.92) 0.638*** (8.00)
Continuous R&D −0.0838 (−0.95) −0.203** (−2.32)
Subsides 0.428*** (5.85)
Science Coop. 0.0315 (0.40)
Market Coop. 0.106 (1.37)
Other  ﬁrms Coop. 0.326*** (4.48)
cons 6.265*** (38.07) 6.175*** (30.53) 6.225*** (30.58) 6.174*** (30.06) 6.313*** (31.35)
Innovation active ﬁrms
Size 0.224*** (12.29) 0.229*** (12.47) 0.229*** (12.49) 0.231*** (12.51) 0.230*** (12.48)
Group  0.0675 (1.18) 0.0700 (1.23) 0.0708 (1.24) 0.0713 (1.25) 0.0705 (1.23)
Education 0.0100*** (8.77) 0.00998*** (8.73) 0.00998*** (8.74) 0.0100*** (8.77) 0.00998*** (8.75)
Local  Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
National 0.408*** (7.90) 0.403*** (7.78) 0.403*** (7.78) 0.400*** (7.71) 0.402*** (7.76)
EU  0.813*** (7.04) 0.822*** (7.06) 0.822*** (7.07) 0.820*** (7.08) 0.819*** (7.07)
International 0.613*** (5.36) 0.605*** (5.28) 0.605*** (5.28) 0.607*** (5.30) 0.606*** (5.29)
0  comp. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
1–5  comp. 0.673*** (6.39) 0.599*** (5.54) 0.598*** (5.53) 0.607*** (5.59) 0.606*** (5.57)
6–10  comp. 0.634*** (5.79) 0.550*** (4.90) 0.547*** (4.87) 0.558*** (4.95) 0.555*** (4.92)
11–15  comp. 0.467*** (3.70) 0.378** (2.94) 0.373** (2.91) 0.376** (2.94) 0.372** (2.90)
16–50  comp. 0.516*** (4.31) 0.437*** (3.58) 0.436*** (3.57) 0.446*** (3.65) 0.447*** (3.65)
50+  comp. 0.327** (2.88) 0.242** (2.07) 0.239** (2.05) 0.251** (2.14) 0.249** (2.11)
No  Uncertainty Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Low  Uncertainty 0.198** (2.36) 0.200** (2.39) 0.199** (2.37) 0.197** (2.36)
Medium Uncertainty 0.333*** (4.04) 0.336*** (4.08) 0.334*** (4.06) 0.334*** (4.05)
High  Uncertainty 0.354*** (3.63) 0.357*** (3.66) 0.358*** (3.67) 0.356*** (3.65)
cons −1.670*** (−12.51) −1.850*** (−12.75) −1.850*** (−12.74) −1.864*** (−12.76) −1.859*** (−12.71)
LL  −6065.7 −6055.3 −6048.5 −5937.2 −5890.6
Rho  0.310 0.307 0.315 0.349 0.333
Wald  test of Rho = 0: Chi2 33.51 32.36 34.09 34.34 29.50
Prob  > Chi2 7.09e-09 1.28e-08 5.25e-09 4.64e-09 5.59e-08
Observations 4,027 4,027 4,027 4,027 4,027
Censored 1,773 1,773 1,773 1,773 1,773
Uncensored 2,254 2,254 2,254 2,254 2,254
Correct predictions 0.462 0.461 0.461 0.460 0.461
t statistics in parentheses.
Notes: Robust standards errors; Industry dummies are included in both equations but not reported; Prediction is correct if innovator gets a prediction above the observed
average  of potential innovation.* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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Table A3
Heckman estimates of ratio of innovative sales on innovation costs for different speciﬁcations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Innovation efﬁciency (Ln)
St.  ext. −0.216 (−1.19) −0.205 (−1.14) −1.230 (−1.22) −1.365 (−1.51) −1.277 (−1.34)
Reg.  ext. −0.272 (−1.34) −0.275 (−1.35) 2.413** (2.48) 2.417** (2.35) 2.217** (2.18)
Size  0.0556** (1.97) 0.0560** (1.99) 0.0544* (1.91) 0.0814*** (2.83) 0.102*** (3.51)
Group  0.0905 (0.97) 0.0860 (0.92) 0.0888 (0.95) 0.0984 (1.06) 0.0673 (0.73)
Education −0.00696*** (−3.62) −0.00687*** (−3.59) −0.00709*** (−3.68) −0.00504*** (−2.67) −0.00256 (−1.33)
Local  ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
National −0.0670 (−0.53) −0.0604 (−0.48) −0.0628 (−0.50) −0.0481 (−0.39) −0.0642 (−0.52)
EU  −0.255 (−1.56) −0.250 (−1.53) −0.240 (−1.45) −0.183 (−1.12) −0.175 (−1.07)
International −0.325* (−1.94) −0.320* (−1.92) −0.319* (−1.90) −0.261 (−1.57) −0.239 (−1.45)
No  Uncertainty ref. ref. ref. ref.
Low  Uncertainty 0.00448 (0.02) 0.0567 (0.30) 0.0570 (0.30) 0.126 (0.67)
Medium Uncertainty −0.134 (−0.67) −0.0620 (−0.33) −0.0507 (−0.27) 0.0101 (0.05)
High  Uncertainty −0.00793 (−0.04) 0.0851 (0.40) 0.0868 (0.41) 0.160 (0.77)
Stand.#L. uncert. 1.287 (1.24) 1.385 (1.49) 1.284 (1.31)
Stand.#M. uncert. 0.925 (0.89) 1.094 (1.16) 1.062 (1.08)
Stand.#H. uncert. 1.591 (1.45) 1.822* (1.80) 1.665 (1.59)
Reg.#L.  uncert. −2.709*** (−2.68) −2.701** (−2.54) −2.482** (−2.36)
Reg.#M. uncert. −2.744*** (−2.70) −2.713** (−2.54) −2.526** (−2.39)
Reg.#H. uncert. −3.674*** (−3.50) −3.562*** (−3.22) −3.266*** (−3.01)
No  R&D ref. ref.
Discontinuous R&D −0.414*** (−3.83) −0.177 (−1.53)
Continuous R&D 0.321*** (2.62) 0.420*** (3.43)
Subsides −0.395*** (−4.64)
Science  Coop. −0.135 (−1.40)
Market  Coop. 0.0506 (0.52)
Other ﬁrms Coop. −0.228** (−2.40)
cons 2.158*** (9.03) 2.191*** (7.23) 2.140*** (6.96) 2.123*** (6.69) 2.022*** (6.28)
Innovation active ﬁrms
Size 0.212*** (10.69) 0.217*** (10.83) 0.217*** (10.82) 0.217*** (10.82) 0.217*** (10.82)
Group  0.0640 (0.99) 0.0661 (1.02) 0.0666 (1.03) 0.0667 (1.03) 0.0662 (1.02)
Education 0.0121*** (9.52) 0.0121*** (9.49) 0.0121*** (9.49) 0.0121*** (9.50) 0.0121*** (9.49)
Local  ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
National 0.490*** (8.40) 0.484*** (8.28) 0.484*** (8.28) 0.484*** (8.27) 0.484*** (8.29)
EU  0.904*** (7.26) 0.910*** (7.25) 0.910*** (7.25) 0.911*** (7.26) 0.910*** (7.26)
International 0.738*** (6.01) 0.727*** (5.92) 0.726*** (5.91) 0.726*** (5.92) 0.726*** (5.91)
0  Comp. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
1–5  comp. 0.795*** (6.45) 0.714*** (5.62) 0.716*** (5.63) 0.719*** (5.66) 0.718*** (5.64)
6–10  comp. 0.730*** (5.72) 0.639*** (4.85) 0.640*** (4.86) 0.643*** (4.89) 0.641*** (4.87)
11–15  comp. 0.529*** (3.55) 0.431*** (2.82) 0.431*** (2.83) 0.434*** (2.85) 0.431*** (2.83)
16–50  comp. 0.606*** (4.34) 0.521*** (3.64) 0.522*** (3.65) 0.525*** (3.68) 0.525*** (3.67)
50+  comp. 0.354*** (2.62) 0.266* (1.92) 0.268* (1.93) 0.272* (1.96) 0.271* (1.94)
No  Uncertainty ref. ref. ref. ref.
Low  Uncertainty 0.285*** (2.95) 0.286*** (2.97) 0.286*** (2.96) 0.286*** (2.96)
Medium Uncertainty 0.415*** (4.36) 0.417*** (4.38) 0.417*** (4.38) 0.417*** (4.38)
High  Uncertainty 0.422*** (3.76) 0.423*** (3.78) 0.423*** (3.78) 0.423*** (3.78)
cons −1.964*** (−13.01) −2.213*** (−13.42) −2.216*** (−13.42) −2.219*** (−13.43) −2.218*** (−13.42)
LL  −4750.0 −4738.5 −4728.7 −4699.8 −4677.2
Rho  −0.144 −0.134 −0.150 −0.158 −0.151
Wald  test of Rho = 0: Chi2 3.353 3.155 3.513 3.679 3.086
Prob  > Chi2 0.0671 0.0757 0.0609 0.0551 0.0790
Observations 3,444 3,444 3,444 3,444 3,444
Censored 1,773 1,773 1,773 1,773 1,773
Uncensored 1,671 1,671 1,671 1,671 1,671
Correct predictions 0.378 0.379 0.379 0.379 0.379
t statistics in parentheses.
Notes: Robust standards errors; Industry dummies are included in both equations but not reported; Prediction is correct if innovator gets a prediction above the observed
average of potential innovation.* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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Table  A4
OLS estimates of ratio of innovative sales on innovation costs (only ﬁrms with positive innovation expenditures).
(1)
innovative sales on innovation costs (ln)
St. ext. −1.253 (−1.31)
No Uncertainty ref.
Low Uncertainty 0.159 (0.85)
Medium Uncertainty 0.0574 (0.31)
High Uncertainty 0.203 (0.98)
Stand.#L. uncert. 1.258 (1.28)
Stand.#M. uncert. 1.037 (1.05)
Stand.#H. uncert. 1.648 (1.57)
Reg. ext. 2.203** (2.15)
Reg.#L. uncert. −2.458** (−2.31)
Reg.#M. uncert. −2.515** (−2.36)
Reg.#H. uncert. −3.246*** (−2.96)
Size 0.123*** (4.61)
Group 0.0736 (0.79)
Education −0.00134 (−0.75)
Local ref.
National 0.0110 (0.10)
EU −0.0717 (−0.48)
International −0.146 (−0.93)
No R&D ref.
Discontinuous R&D −0.171 (−1.46)
Continuous R&D 0.426*** (3.45)
Subsides −0.393*** (−4.58)
Science Coop. −0.136 (−1.39)
Market Coop. 0.0488 (0.49)
Other ﬁrms Coop. −0.232** (−2.41)
cons 1.657*** (6.98)
Adjusted R2 0.145
Observation 1,671
t statistics in parentheses.
Notes: Robust standards errors; Industry dummies are included but not reported.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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